Sartrean conceptions of the Ego, emotions, language, and the imaginary provide a comprehensive account of "magic" that could ultimately give rise to a new philosophical psychology. By focusing upon only one of these here— the imaginary —we see that through its irrealizing capabilities consciousness contaminates the world and bewitches itself in a manner that defies simple deterministic explication. We highlight this with an explication of what Sartre means by "nihilation" and the "analogon," and introduce a concrete example of nostalgia, hoping (...) to lay the scene for a detailed study into the dynamic between our ontological freedom and its constitution and experience of phenomena as enchanting and bewitching. "Magical being" must therefore involve a deep, Sartrean analysis that explicates ontological freedom as becoming concretely engaged in both the real and irreal alike, whereby the imaginary as magic can lead to the most insane, as well as the most artistic, incantations. (shrink)

Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well as (...) believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better, with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core. (shrink)

By introducing 'drives' into a Sartrean framework, 'being-in-itself' is interpreted as 'Nature as such', wherein instincts dominate. Being-for-itself, on the contrary, has an ontological nature diametrically opposed to this former – indeed, in the latter realm, through a fundamental process of 'nihilation' (Sartre's 'freedom') consciousness perpetually flees itself by transcending towards the world. However, a kernel of (our) nihilated Nature is left at the heart of this process, in the form of 'original facticity' that we here name drives. Drives are (...) the original feelings and urges of a freed Nature that simply are there; they are the fundamental forces that consciousness qua freedom always has to deal with. Drives, in addition, can be nihilated in their own turn, onto a reflective, irreal plane, whereby they take the form of value . This means Sartre's notion of ontological desire is always made up of two necessary components: drives and value. (shrink)

I argue for three different concepts of God in Being and Nothingness. First I review the relevant scholarship with regard to Sartre, religion, and God. Second I show how Sartre uses three Gods in his ontological system: God as Nature, God as radical Otherness, and God as absolute Value. Third I show that Sartre’s conception of the imaginary explains how a purer, more theoretical conception of God can be perverted into more anthropocentrised and anthropomorphised versions. Fourth I consider the consequences (...) of sticking to more Sartrean notions which ultimately can emphasise humility, respect, and responsibility before Nature, the Other, and Value, thereby calling for a reduction of both anthropomorphism and -centrism in religious faith and our conceptions of God. (shrink)

This paper contrasts Sartre’s account of emotion with Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit and ‘mood’. Sartre’s account of emotion is a strong one: emotions occur only when a more neutral and colourless ‘pragmatic attitude’ is frustrated or breaks down. In this manner, emotion has to be acutely felt in and through the body, which also means that there are many circumstances and states in which we do not undergo any emotion at all. In fact, Sartre’s ‘pragmatic attitude’ is precisely the mode (...) in which we simply go about our business in an emotionless manner. This raises the question as to whether Sartre’s stark opposition between emotional and non-emotional experiences actually holds. I believe Heidegger’s account of Befindlichkeit and its moods are key in this regard, in that it can be used to nuance the Sartrean account. Indeed, Heidegger famously states that Dasein is never unattuned. In fact, precisely because of the ontological structure of Befindlichkeit, the world always already matters to us in one way or another, with moods being one of our primary ways of experiencing what matters and why. This discussion therefore aims to yield an account whereby faint moods and strong emotions form two poles of the same dynamic. To use a metaphor, moods are the tectonic plates that make the various emotional shakes and quakes possible in any given situation. Finally, I finish with some possible remaining tensions between the two thinkers, as well as a way to look for a possible solution. (shrink)

This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of (self-)censorship and morality as internalised aggression. I then show how this conception expands and can be detailed through a defence of a hydraulic model of the psyche that has specific “safety valves” of disgust, shame, and pity constantly counteracting specific sets of Freudian drives. This (...) model is important for explicating Freud’s crucial concept of sublimation, which continues to have key therapeutic and normative relevance today, which I show through the case of jokes. I finish with the argument that largely happy, productive lives can be seen as in a dynamic between the release of too much (perversion) and too little (neurosis) psychical pressure through these mechanisms. (shrink)

Первое российское энциклопедическое издание, посвященное философии буддизма, является самым полным в отечественной литературе сводом знаний о буддийской философии. Его главная цель - описать философское кредо буддизма в контексте разнообразия школ.

Study of Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, treatise on Hindu Advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy, by Prakāśānanda, 16th cent.

Concept of Avidyā in the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya; a study.

Is there any link between the doctrine of logical fatalism and prime numbers? What do logic and prime numbers have in common? The book adopts truth-functional approach to examine functional properties of finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics Łn+1. Prime numbers are defined in algebraic-logical terms and represented as rooted trees. The author designs an algorithm which for every prime number n constructs a rooted tree where nodes are natural numbers and n is a root. Finite-valued logics Kn+1 are specified that they have (...) tautologies if and only if n is a prime number. It is discovered that Kn+1 have the same functional properties as Łn+1 whenever n is a prime number. Thus, Kn+1 are 'logics' of prime numbers. Amazingly, combination of logics of prime numbers led to uncovering a law of generation of classes of prime numbers. Along with characterization of prime numbers author also gives characterization, in terms of Łukasiewicz logical matrices, of powers of primes, odd numbers, and even numbers. (shrink)

Razdel 1. F. Nit︠s︡she i russkai︠a︡ myslʹ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka -- Razdel 2. Religii︠a︡ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka -- Razdel 3. Russkai︠a︡ germenevtika -- Razdel 4. Filosofii︠a︡ imeni v Rossii.

Contributed articles on self-realization.

Hagiography of Sankaracarya, the exponent of Advaita philosophy.

Mikhail Psel i vizantiĭskii︠a︡t khumanizŭm na XI vek -- Palamitskite sporove.

Multilingual dictionary of philosophical terms.